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II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A.

Nature of the Case
This is an appeal from Mr. Christopher Foote's judgment of conviction and sentence for

possession of a controlled substance.
B.

Factual Summary and General Course of Proceedings
On February 14, 2012, Mr. Foote was charged with possessing methamphetamine, a

felony, in violation ofldaho Code§ 37-2732(c)(l). R. 9-10. The State alleged that on the day
prior, February 13, 2012, Mr. Foote "unlawfully possessed a controlled substance classified in
Scheduled II of the Uniform Controlled Substances Act, to wit, the defendant possessed
Methamphetamine, as defined by Idaho Code section 37-2707(d)." Id. Mr. Foote waived his
preliminary hearing and was bound over to the district court for an entry of plea. R. 52. An
Information was then filed mirroring the charge previously set forth in the Complaint. R. 57-58.
Mr. Foote entered a plea of not guilty before the district court. R. 73-75.
On April 4, 2012, Mr. Foote filed a Motion to Suppress arguing that "the officers entered
the residence of the defendant without consent, probable cause, or a warrant, in violation of the
4th amendment to the United States Constitution and similar provisions of the Idaho
Constitution." R. 78-79. Prior to the hearing on Mr. Foote's Motion to Suppress, a Substitution
of Counsel was filed as well as a Stipulation to Continue. R. 94-97. With new defense counsel
in place, the hearing on Mr. Foote's Motion to Suppress was subsequently held on May 16, 2012.
Motion to Suppress Transcript, p. 2.
At the conclusion of the hearing the district court pronounced its findings of fact. Motion
to Suppress Transcript, pp. 67-71 and R. 109-10.

"On February 13 th of 2012, in Bingham County, Idaho, dispatch was
advised by a landlord ... that he was concerned with a tenant [Mr. Foote]
and a disturbance going on in the apartment, and he was concerned,
apparently, about something happening to the apartment." Motion to
Suppress Transcript, p. 68, Ins. 6-11.
"Dispatch contacts [three law enforcement officers who] make contact
with the landlord, Mr. Ely." Motion to Suppress Transcript, p. 68, Ins. 1215.
"[The landlord] takes them into his home and directs them to where the
defendant's apartment is. And in doing so, he takes them through his
house, the landlord's house, through the kitchen, which has a door that
adjoins the stairwell and the garage, described in Exhibit A submitted here
today." Motion to Suppress Transcript, p. 68, Ins. 16-21.
"In looking at Exhibit A, looking at that document, the defendant has
outlined a rectangular home, outlined his apartment which is upstairs, has
drawn on there what appears to be a sidewalk to a door on the right side of
that diagram and towards the bottom of that diagram in the right-hand
comer. He indicates that that's a door that people come to when they
come to visit him and that it remains locked." Motion to Suppress
Transcript, pp. 68-69, Ins. 22-4.
"[T]he garage is [the landlord's], which connects to the stairwell, which
connects to his kitchen, which [Mr. Foote] explained was to the left of that
stairwell .... " Motion to Suppress Transcript, p. 69, Ins. 5-8.
"This Court finds that that area is basically a common area. At least it
belongs to [the landlord], and he has the authority to allow people into that
area." Motion to Suppress Transcript, p. 69, Ins. 9-11.
"When you go up stairs, then there's a makeshift door." Motion to
Suppress Transcript, p. 69, Ins. 12-13.
"[T]he officers did, after being shown where the apartment was, go up
those stairs and knock on the door, and [Mr. Foote] opened the door at that
point." Motion to Suppress Transcript, p. 69, Ins. 14-17.
"The officers, in getting there, were checking and investigating the
disturbance ... they were doing a welfare check." Motion to Suppress
Transcript, p. 69, Ins. 18-20.
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"[W]hen [the officers] knocked on the door, that contact - initial contact
was very short. They asked [Mr. Foote] to come downstairs." Motion to
Suppress Transcript, p. 69, Ins. 21-23.
"During that short period of time, the officer did note [Mr. Foote] looked a
little disheveled, was disorientated, and was sweating." Motion to
Suppress Transcript, pp. 69-70, Ins. 23-1.
"When they asked him to come downstairs, rather than coming downstairs,
he put his hand in his pocket and turned back into the apartment." Motion
to Suppress Transcript, p. 70, Ins. 2-4.
"The officer, being concerned for his safety based upon that movement of
putting his hand in his pocket, follows him in." Motion to Suppress
Transcript, p. 70, Ins. 17-19.
"[W]ithin a short distance, [Mr. Foote] removes a pipe and puts it into the
drawer. The officer observes that pipe and knows, from his training and
experience, that it is a marijuana pipe and sees a lightbulb within the
dresser as well consistent with one used for smoking methamphetamine."
Motion to Suppress Transcript, p. 70, Ins. 19-25.
"[Mr. Foote] closes the drawer, at which time the officer promptly opens
the drawer and places those on top of the dresser. They then place Mr.
Foote in a chair and then begin to question him. After a certain point in
time, he gives them consent to search the rest of the apartment." Motion
to Suppress Transcript, p. 71, Ins. 4-7.
The district court refrained however from ruling on Mr. Foote's motion and took the matter
under advisement for a couple of days. At a status conference held two days later, the district
court articulated its rationale and conclusions oflaw, ultimately dening Mr. Foote's Motion to
Suppress. Status Conference Transcript, pp. 3-13 and R. 112-13. The district court concluded
that law enforcement's concern for safety justified the warrantless entry into Mr. Foote's
apartment. Status Conference Transcript, p. 12, Ins. 19-25.
A change of plea hearing was subsequently scheduled for May 24, 2012. At the change
of plea hearing Mr. Foote apparently expressed a number of concerns regarding the proposed
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plea agreement so the matter was continued and then eventually rescheduled for a pretrial
conference and jury trial. R. 114-117. Thereafter Mr. Foote's counsel attempted to withdraw on
a number of occasions and eventually did withdraw, with the district court's permission, thus
leaving Mr. Foote pro se for the upcoming jury trial. R. 119-41.
On the day the jury trial was scheduled to commence Mr. Foote, acting prose, entered a
conditional guilty plea pursuant to plea negotiations with the State. R. 183-84 and Transcript of
July 24, 2012 Hearing. The district court sentenced Mr. Foote to a unified term of 6 years with 2
years determinate, and suspended the imposition of the sentence and placed Mr. Foote on
probation for a period of 5 years. R. 228-34. This timely appeal follows.

III. ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1. Did the district court err in denying Mr. Foote's motion to suppress and finding that

law enforcement's warrantless intrusion into Mr. Foote's apartment was justified?

IV. ARGUMENT
A.

The District Court Erred in Denying Mr. Foote's Motion to Suppress
1.

Introduction

The district court denied Mr. Foote's motion to suppress citing two specific cases; Ryburn

v. Huff, 132 S.Ct. 987 (2012), and State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804 (2009). The district court's
reliance on these two cases was misplaced. As a result, the district court's ruling was in error
because a correct application oflaw to the facts of this case supports the granting of Mr. Foote's
motion to suppress and finding that the intrusion into his apartment violated his rights to be free
from unreasonable searches and seizures.

2.

Standard of review

When reviewing a district court's ruling on a motion to suppress, Idaho appellate courts
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apply a bifurcated standard ofreview. State v. Ray, 153 Idaho 564,286 P.3d 1114, 1117 (2012).
The appellate court will accept the district court's findings of fact so long as they are supported
by substantial evidence but it will freely review any constitutional principles implicated by the
facts. Id. This includes the exercise of free review as to whether a search is reasonable, and
therefore complies with the Fourth Amendment. State v. Reynolds, 146 Idaho 466 (Ct. App.
2008).

3.

The warrantless entry into Mr. Foote's apartment was illegal because the
circumstances did not support a reasonable belief that immediate entry into
the home was necessary

As stated by the Supreme Court recently most recently:
The Fourth Amendment provides in relevant part that the "right of the people to
be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated." The Amendment establishes a
simple baseline, one that for much of our history formed the exclusive basis for its
protections: When "the Governrnent obtains information by physically intruding"
on persons, houses, papers, or effects, "a 'search' within the original meaning of
the Fourth Amendment" has "undoubtedly occurred."

Florida v. Jardines, 133 S.Ct. 1409, 1414, 185 L.Ed. 2d 495 (2013) (internal citations omitted).
"The Fourth Amendment 'indicates with some precision the places and things encompassed by
its protections': persons, houses, papers, and effects." Id. (quoting Oliver v. United States, 466
U.S. 170, 176, 104 S.Ct. 1735, 80 L.Ed.2d 214 (1984)). The protections of the Fourth
Amendment are not absolute, "[b ]ut when it comes to the Fourth Amendment, the home is first
among equals. At the Amendment's 'very core' stands 'the right of a man to retreat into his own
home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion."' Id. (quoting Silverman v.

United States, 365 U.S. 505,511, 81 S.Ct. 679, 5 L.Ed.2d 734 (1961)). Law enforcement's
entry into a home without a warrant are presumed to be unreasonable. Payton v. New York, 445
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U.S. 573,586, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 1380, 63 L.Ed.2d 639, 650 (1980).
Here, the district court held that the officer's warrantless entry into Mr. Foote's apartment
was justified under the circumstances. "When the warrantless search is to a home or curtilage,
we recognize two exceptions to the warrant requirement: exigency and emergency." Sims v.
Stanton, 706 F.3d 954, 960 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Hopkins v. Bonvicino, 573 F.3d 752, 763 (9th

Cir. 2009). In determining whether exigent circumstances justifies a warrantless entry into a
home the Court of Appeals has provided the following guidance:
The test for application of this warrant exception is whether the facts known to the
agent at the time of entry, together with reasonable inferences would warrant a
reasonable belief that an exigency justified the intrusion. Reynolds, 146 Idaho at
470, 197 P.3d at 331; State v. Barrett, 138 Idaho 290, 293, 62 P.3d 214, 217 (Ct.
App. 2003). A law enforcement officer's reasonable belief of danger to the police
or to other persons inside or outside the dwelling is one type of exigency that may
justify a warrantless entry. Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 100, 110 S.Ct. 1684,
1689, 109 L.Ed.2d 85, 95 (1990); Reynolds, 146 Idaho at 470, 197 P.3d at 331.
Thus, the necessity to protect or preserve life or avoid serious injury will
legitimize an otherwise illegal intrusion. Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart, 547 U.S.
398,403, 126 S.Ct. 1943, 1947, 164 L.Ed.2d 650,657 (2006). Accordingly, law
enforcement officers may enter a home without a warrant to render emergency
assistance to an injured occupant or to protect an occupant from imminent injury.
Id.
State v. Araiza, 147 Idaho 371, 374-75, 209 P.3d 668, 671-72 (Ct. App. 2009).

In that case law enforcement observed an unidentified male attempting to enter a
residence through a window late at night. Araiza, 147 Idaho at 373,209 P.3d at 670. Having
lost sight of the man, law enforcement knocked on the door of the residence which was answered
by an elderly woman. Id. Responding to law enforcement's concern, the woman stated the man
in question was Mr. Araiza and that everything was fine. Id. Law enforcement nonetheless
asked to speak with the man so the woman beckoned Mr. Araiza, who came to the door and
identified himself. Id. Law enforcement then returned to his patrol vehicle to check Mr.
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Araiza's name, date of birth, and social security number. Id. Meanwhile, Mr. Araiza asked
another law enforcement officer who had arrived, if he could go put on some additional clothes
as he had come to the door in only a pair of unzipped pants. Id. With law enforcement's
permission, Mr. Araiza reentered the residence and shut the door. Id. Unable to confirm Mr.
Araiza's identity, law enforcement again knocked on the door. Id. No one answered the now
locked door. Id.
Another woman who apparently lived nearby approached law enforcement and identified
herself as the elderly woman's daughter. Id. She informed law enforcement that she did not
know Mr. Araiza and that the only people who should be in the elderly woman's house were the
elderly woman herself and the daughter's two young sons. Id. Law enforcement and the
daughter continued their attempts to contact the elderly woman by knocking on the door and
calling on the phone. Id. Another grandson of the elderly woman arrived and advised law
enforcement that he did not know Mr. Araiza and that no other adult should be in the house. Id.
After unsuccessfully contacting the elderly woman, and seeing that she and Mr. Araiza
were in fact still inside, law enforcement broke down the door and entered the house. Id. The
Court of Appeals held "there existed exigent circumstances that validated the warrantless entry
into the residence, given the officers' reasonable concern for the safety of [the elderly woman]
and her two grandchildren." Id. at 375, 209 P.3d at 672. The Araiza Court further explained that
"where Araiza's identity remained a mystery and the officers attempted to repeatedly to contact
the occupants of the residence without success, and several family members expressed concern
that an unauthorized individual was in the residence, we conclude that there existed exigent
circumstances to justify the officer's warrantless entry into the residence." Id. at 376, 209 P.3d
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at 673.
Similarly, in State v. Barrett, 138 Idaho 290, 62 P.3d 214 (Ct. App. 2003) the Court of
Appeals held exigent circumstances justified law enforcement's warrantless entry into another
residence. Id. at 294-95, 62 P.3d at 218-19. In that case the resident was suffering an
unexplained and serious medical emergency, and law enforcement was unable to contact any of
the other known residents of the home. Id. Mr. Barrett, the resident, told his neighbor that he
may be having a heart attack, and was incoherent and in the fetal position on the neighbor's front
porch when law enforcement arrived. Id. at 292, 62 P.3d at 216. Upon learning Mr. Barrett's
wife and two children had not been seen all day, law enforcement approached Mr. Barrett's front
door which had been left open. Id. After loudly identifying themselves and asking anyone inside
to come to the front door, law enforcement entered Mr. Barrett's home in order to determine
whether others were also in need of medical assistance. Id. The Court of Appeals concluded that
"[u]nder the totality of the facts and circumstances as known to the police at the time that they
entered Barrett's house, and reasonable inferences drawn thereupon, we conclude that there
existed a compelling need for the police to enter." Id. at 294, 62 P.3d at 218.
In contrast to Araiza and Barrett, the Court of Appeals has found that exigent
circumstances did not justify the warrantless entry into a residence in cases such as State v.

Rusho, 110 Idaho 556, 716 P.2d 1328 (Ct. App. 1986) and State v. Reynolds, 146 Idaho 466 (Ct.
App. 2008). In Rusho law enforcement entered the residence even though prior to entry they had
been informed that the "exigent circumstance" - a concern an intruder was in the residence

had

been dispelled because the homeowner as well as a neighbor had checked the house and
confirmed no intruder actually existed. Rusho, 110 Idaho at 559, 716 P.2d at 1331. Similarly, in
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Reynolds, the Court of Appeals held the circumstances "did not support a reasonable belief that

immediate entry into the home was necessary." Reynolds, 146 Idaho at 471, 197 P.3d at 332.
There law enforcement, responding to a call that a wife was being held in a house against her
will, arrived to find the husband standing outside. The Reynolds Court concluded that there was
no immediate risk of harm so long as the husband was outside being questioned about the
circumstances. Id.
The circumstances in this case stand in stark contrast to the facts in Araiza and Barrett.
Unlike Araiza, here there was no concern anyone was present in the apartment who should not
be. There was also no concern that anyone was being held against their will. Nor was there any
obvious and ongoing medical emergency as existed in Barrett. Instead Mr. Foote appropriately
responded to the knock on his door and appeared "a little disheveled, was disorientated, and was
sweating." Motion to Suppress Transcript, pp. 69-70, Ins. 24-1. There is nothing highly unusual
about Mr. Foote's appearance - arguably a large number of people would similarly appear when
answering their door late at night and finding three uniformed officers awaiting. He was not
aggressive or combative with law enforcement. He simply put his hand in his pocket and turned
and walked deeper into his apartment.
The district court's reliance upon Ryburn v. Huff, 132 S.Ct. 987, 181 L.Ed. 966 (2012),
and State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804,203 P.3d 1203 (2009) was also misplaced. In Ryburn, law
enforcement was investigating whether a juvenile, who had a history of being bullied and had
been absent for consecutive days, was intending to shoot up his school. Ryburn, 132 S.Ct. at
988. Law enforcement responded to the juvenile's residence and knocked on the door and called
the home telephone. Id. Neither were answered. Id. Law enforcement were then able to reach
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the juvenile's mother on her cell phone and she advised that both she and the juvenile were in
fact inside the house. Id. The juvenile and his mother then came outside to speak with police
and the juvenile acknowledged the rumor about the threats on his school. Id. When law
enforcement inquired about any guns being present in the home the mother immediately turned
around and ran into the home. Id. at 989. Out of a concern for their safety, law enforcement
entered the residence behind the mother. Id. In the context of a civil rights complaint under 42
U.S.C. § 1983, the Supreme Court held:
Reasonable police officers in [law enforcement's position in this case] could have
come to the conclusion that the Fourth Amendment permitted them to enter the
[juvenile's] residence if there was an objectively reasonable basis for fearing that
violence was imminent. And a reasonable officer could have come to such a
conclusion based on the fact as found by the District Court.

Id. at 992.
Unlike Ryburn, there were absolutely no facts supporting the proposition that violence
was imminent with Mr. Foote. The call to dispatch was about a disturbance

not that Mr. Foote

was threatening to harm anyone. The officers in Ryburn were presented with a situation
concerning a very serious concern about the safety of a large number of people in conjunction
with the mother's unusual response to the inquiry regarding guns in the home. There was no
grave concern about Mr. Foote or his desire to harm anyone, including himself. Moreover, his
response to law enforcement's request to exit his apartment and come downstairs to answer their
questions was not highly unusual.
The district court also cited Bishop in denying Mr. Foote's motion to suppress. Frankly it
is unclear why the district court found Bishop as precedent in this case. The crux of the analysis
in Bishop is whether or not law enforcement was justified in frisking Mr. Bishop, or put
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differently, whether law enforcement had reason to believe Mr. Bishop was armed and presently
dangerous to the officer or to others. Bishop, 146 Idaho at 818-21, 203 P.3d at 1217-20. The
issue presented to the district court in this case was not whether or not law enforement could
have frisked Mr. Foote had they so desired. Nevertheless, Mr. Foote acknowledges the
determination of whether or not a frisk is lawful and whether or not exigent circumstances permit
law enforcement to enter a residence are both objective tests based upon the totality of the
circumstances.
Perhaps the district court found the factors in determining whether someone could
reasonably conclude a suspect is armed and dangerous as persuasive when determining whether
Mr. Foote was armed and dangerous. But as in Bishop, there were no objective facts to support a
conclusion that Mr. Foote was dangerous. There were no bulges in Mr. Foote's clothing
resembling a weapon, the encounter did not occur in a high crime area, Mr. Foote did not make
any aggressive movements, and he did not have a reputation for being dangerous. Yes, it was
late at night and Mr. Foote appeared disheveled. He also placed his hand in his pocket and
walked further into his apartment. The totality of the circumstances of this case do not support a
finding that a reasonable person would conclude Mr. Foote to be an imminent threat to law
enforcement's safety- especially one justifying a warrantless entry into a residence.
Simply put, immediate entry into Mr. Foote's apartment was not necessary. Law
enforcement had only generalized, nonspecific information about Mr. Foote. What was known
by law enforcement at the time they entered into Mr. Foote's apartment was that the landlord had
heard a disturbance, the landlord was concerned about his rental property, and that Mr. Foote
appeared a little disheveled, disorientated, and was sweating. Law enforcement did not observe
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Mr. Foote commit any criminal act. Law enforcement did not have probable cause to arrest Mr.
Foote. There was no evidence to suggest that he was armed or about to harm himself, nor any
evidence that he had history of violence. Instead law enforcement manufactured their own
emergency and used it as a pretext for an otherwise warrantless and unlawful entry and search
inside Mr. Foote's apartment. A Fourth Amendment analysis inherently entails the balancing of
the defendant's privacy interest against the governmental need for the action that was taken.

State v. Henderson, 114 Idaho 293, 304-05, 756 P.2d 1057, 1068-69 (1988); State v. Reed, 129
Idaho 503,505, 927 P.2d 893, 895 (Ct. App. 1996); State v. Rusho, 110 Idaho 556,558, 716 P.2d
1328, 1330 (Ct. App. 1986). Under the circumstances known to law enforcement at the time of
their warrantless entry into Mr. Foote's apartment, Mr. Foote's privacy interest far outweighs any
need for immediate governmental action.
Mr. Foote had the right to remain in his apartment and walk away from law enforcement
on February 13, 2012. He had the right to disregard law enforcement's request to speak with him
and be left alone. As the Idaho Supreme Court has recognized, "[p]erhaps the most important
attribute of our way of life in Idaho is individual liberty. A citizen is free to stroll the streets,
hike the mountains, and float the rivers of this state without interference from the government."

State v. Henderson, 114 Idaho 293,298, 756 P.2d 1057, 1062 (1988).
Accordingly, based on the foregoing argument and authority, the district court erred in
denying Mr. Foote's motion to suppress, and any and all evidence recovered by law enforcement
from inside his apartment should have been suppressed. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S.
471 (1963); see also State v. Arregui, 44 Idaho 43, 254 P.788 (1927) (adopting an exclusionary
rule under the Idaho Constitution).
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V. CONCLUSION
For all the reasons set forth above, this Court should reverse the district court's decision
denying Mr. Foote's Motion to Suppress and grant the motion thus vacating his judgment of
conviction and sentence.
Respectfully submitted this Jl_ day of July, 2013.

Atto
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ownson
for Christopher Foote

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this Q day of July 2013, I caused two true and correct
copies of the foregoing to be mailed to:
Deputy Attorney General
Criminal Law Division
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, ID 83720-0010
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